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THE SEARCH FOR BRIGHT LINES IN TAKINGS CLAUSE
ANALYSIS: MARITRANS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
J. SCOTT RICHARDSON*
INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA 90") as
a response to the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster.' This act
requires that all single-hulled oil transportation vessels be replaced by,
or retrofitted to become, double-hulled vessels.2 Maritrans, Inc.
('Maritrans"), the owner of thirty-seven single-hulled vessels, claimed
that the majority of its fleet became obsolete the moment OPA 90
became effective. 3 Maritrans filed a claim against the United States
government and sought compensation for the loss of its vessels or, in
the alternative, the cost of retrofitting them to meet the new standards.4
This comment will address the viability of a "bright line" test
for determining whether a compensable taking has occurred. Part I
gives an overview of the events leading up to the OPA 90 and studies
the effect of OPA 90 on Maritrans. Part II gives a brief history of Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause jurisprudence and focuses on the
development of this body of law as it relates to the issues in the case at
hand. Part III combines this background with the particular reasoning
applied by the Federal Court of Claims in Maritransv. United States.
Part IV analyzes the court of claims' decision and how it advances an
understanding of compensable takings analysis. Two particularly
relevant areas of this analysis are: (1) how much regulation is required
before a claimant is refused just compensation; and (2) whether there
is a distinction between takings of personal property and real property.

'Senior Staff Member, Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law; J.D., 2000
University of Kentucky.

146 U.S.C. § 3703 (1990).
2See id.
3
See Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. CI. 790 (1998).
4See id.
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I. CASE HISTORY

A. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker ran aground on
Bligh Reef, Alaska, and spilled more than eleven million gallons of oil
into Alaska's Prince William Sound.' It was one of the most extensive
environmental disasters in U.S. history and the clean-up costs exceeded
two billion dollars.6 In response to this catastrophe, Congress enacted
OPA 90.'
OPA 90 requires that all vessels "constructed or adapted to carry
... oil in bulk as cargo or cargo residue" and which operate in waters
under the jurisdiction of the United States, have a double-hull.
Double-hull construction uses a second hull to act as a shell around the
typical single-hulled tanker. The shell provided by the second hull
enables the inside hull to remain intact even when the outside hull has
been punctured or torn.9 The purpose of the extra protection is to
minimize oil leakage.'° This requirement provides for the transition of
tankers already in use." Vessels that have a single hull may operate
unchanged until January 1, 2010,12 while those vessels with a double
bottom or double sides (but
not a complete double-hull) may operate 'as
3
is' until January 1, 2015.'

5

See S. REP. No. 101-99, at.l-2 (1990).
See <http://www.oilspill.state.ak.ussettlement/ settlement.htm> (March 8,2000). The
resulting settlement between the State of Alaska, Exxon and the United States called for $25
million in criminal penalties to be paid by Exxon (after they were given a credit of $100 million
for assisting in the clean-up), $100 million in restitution for environmental damage, and $900
million as a civil settlement to be paid over 10 years with additional liability to local governments
of $100 million should the cost figures used in the settlement prove to be inadequate to restore
their resources.
7
See 46 U.S.C.A. §3703a (1990).
5
OPA 90 at (a)1-2.
6

9

See Tammy M. Alcock, "Ecology Tanksand the Oil Pollution Act of*1990: A
History of EJlbrts to Require Double-Hulls on Oil Tankers. 19 ECOLOGY L. Q. 97, 108-09

(1992).

0

°See id.
' ISee OPA 90 at (c)(4)(A).
12See id.

13See id. at (c)(4)(B).
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B. Maritrans
Maritrans owns a domestic fleet of barges used for the transport
of oil.' 4 Thirty-seven of the vessels in the fleet were affected by OPA
90, a substantial portion of Maritrans' fleet.'" By the date of trial,
eleven vessels had been sold or scrapped because of the regulation.
Approximately ninety percent of Maritrans' remaining vessels were not
double-hulled as required by OPA 90 and must either be retrofitted or
eventually taken out of service. 6 Only sixteen percent of the fleet's
overall carrying capacity of 4.3 million barrels of oil were compliant. 7
Seventy-four percent of carrying capacity was invested in vessels with
single hulls and single bottoms which would have required extensive
retrofitting to meet the regulations by 2010.'8 The remaining ten
percent of carrying capacity was represented by vessels with double
bottoms which must be retrofitted to meet the regulations by January 1,
2014.19
At trial, Maritrans argued that OPA 90 was a regulatory taking
of its corporate property because retrofitting their non-compliant
vessels was not economically feasible.2 ° Maritrans also argued that the
regulation eliminated any market in which they could have previously
sold the non-compliant vessels.2' The company stated that this
frustration and depravation of investment-backed expectations as to the
useful working lives of their vessels entitled them to compensation.22
Maritrans claimed it felt the economic impact immediately even though
the dates for compliance with OPA 90 were fifteen to twenty-five years
in the future. 23 The company reasoned that the damage to investmentbacked expectations was inflicted on the date OPA 90 was enacted into
law, for it was at this moment that "the future revenue stream was
terminated as of a date certain for each vessel. 24

14See Maritrans, 40 Fed. CI. 790, 791.
15See id.
16

See id.

17See id.
18See id.
2'

9

See id.

0

See id at 792.

21

See id.
22
23See id.
See id.
24
1d. at791.
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C. History of the Case
Maritrans brought suit in the Federal Court of Claims asserting
that OPA 90 was a compensatory taking of its property as defined by
the Fifth Amendment. 25 The court of claims applied the two-tiered
Takings Clause analysis used by the Federal Circuit of the United States
Court of Appeals in M & J Coal Co. v. United States26 as set forth in
Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastalCouncil.27 At issue in M& JCoalwas
whether the Office of Surface Mining's refusal to allow mining that
could produce significant damage to structures above the coal seam
constituted a compensable taking.28 M & J Coal Co. ('M & J") stated
that they had purchased from the property owners the rights to mine the
coal seam beneath their property "without being liable for any injury or
damage done to the overlying surface."29 They claimed that a taking
occurred when the Office of Surface Mining placed restrictions on these
property rights.30
The two-tiered analysis applied by the court of appeals required
M & J to show that the use or interest allegedly taken by the
government was a "'stick in the bundle of property rights' acquired by
the owner."'31 The second inquiry is whether government action
interfered with that property right. In making these inquiries, the court
held that the M & J purchased only the right to mine coal, not the right
to mine in a way that endangered public health and safety.32 The court
concluded that the second inquiry in the two-tier analysis was
unnecessary because M & J failed to satisfy the first-tier by showing a
property right existed.
As stated above, if the first-tier demonstrates that a property
right exists, then the court seeks to determine whether government
interference with that right has occurred. This further inquiry is
comprised of three factors which were outlined in Penn Centralv. City
of New York.33 Penn Central requires that a court examine (1) the
character of the government's action; (2) the economic impact of the
25

See id.
2647 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The OSM had issued a cessation order for M & J to
stop the mining of coal pillars which had been left as supports for the overlying land by earlier

mining operations.
27505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
28
See M & J Coal, 47 F.3d at 1150.
29
1d.

30

1d.

31

1d. at 1154 (citing Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889).
32
See id.
33438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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government's action on the claimant; and (3) the interference with the
investment backed opportunities of the claimant resulting from the
governmental action in question. 34 These determinations are made on
a case-by-case basis.
In July 1997, the court of claims ruled that at the time
Maritrans built or acquired each of its vessels it could not have
reasonably foreseen that double-hulls would be required during their
estimated working lifetime. 35 This holding satisfied the third factor in
the Penn Centralanalysis in that OPA 90 interfered with the investment
backed expectation of Maritrans when it purchased its single-hulled
vessels. The analysis articulated in Penn Central presumes the
existence of a valid property right. After the court of claims' decision
in Maritrans,however, the government asked the court to re-examine
the Penn Central assumption by asking whether Maritrans actually
possessed a property right in their vessels. In light of this request, the
government also re-asserted the rule that no compensable taking can
occur without a valid property interest.3 6
The government's request dated back to April 1997 when the
United States moved for a dismissal of the action for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.37 More specifically, the
government claimed that Maritrans did not possess a property right
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.38 The government's
motion was denied by the court on grounds that:
whether an industry is so highly regulated as to deprive
its participants of a compensable property interest in
maintaining operations is a matter of degree, and
perhaps of fact. The U.S. shipping industry may be
highly regulated, but we are not prepared to rule that
plaintiffs cannot prove a set of facts that would entitle
39
them to relief.
Notwithstanding the denial of the government's motion, the question of
whether Maritrans could prove the existence of a property right as a
matter of fact still remained.

"See id.at 2648.
35See Maritrans.40 Fed. C1. 790, 793.
36
See id. at 79 1.
37See id.
38

See id.
391d.
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AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. From "Invasion" to "Regulation": The Early Stages of the Takings
Concept
In 1791 the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States was ratified, stating in part that "private property [shall not] be
taken for public use, without just compensation."4 0 This portion of the
Fifth Amendment, known as the Takings Clause, was selectively
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
thereby applying the provisions and restrictions of the clause to the
individual states.4" Early case law construed the Takings Clause
language narrowly, holding that compensation was only necessary
when the government physically invaded or destroyed private
property.4 2
The rule that any physical invasion of private property by the
government results in a compensable taking is still valid. For instance,
in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.," the Court held
that even the limited space required for the running of a television cable
through the walls of a building and the addition of connection boxes on
the building's roof were sufficient invasions of the cable company's
private property to require compensation by the government. Through
the 1920s, however, the United States Supreme Court rejected
arguments that government regulations were compensable takings when
they did not result in governmental invasion or occupation of private
property, even though these regulations sometimes created great
hardships on property owners.44
The Court's definition of compensable takings significantly
broadened in 1922 with Justice Holmes' majority opinion in

40U.S. CONST. amend. V.
41See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 17 S. Ct.
581 (1897).
42
See, for example, Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (finding no taking when
'game and fish protector', appointed by state, destroyed nets used for illegal fishing); Pumpelly
v. Greenbay and Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1872) (finding the government to have
"taken" property by flooding it during the creation of a government authorized dam).
3458 U.S. 419 (1982).
44See Robert K. Best, Evolution and Thumbnail Sketch of Takings Law, SC43 ALIABA I at 3-4 (1998) ( discussion of pre- 1920's takings cases.) See also Mugler v. Kansas, 8 S.
Ct. 273 (I 887)(state prohibition of brewery operation held not a taking); Reinman v. Little Rock,
35 S.Ct. 511 (1915)(city prohibition of livery stables held not a deprivation of property within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 36 S. Ct. 143 (1915)
(prohibition of brickyard held not a taking).
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Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon,4 S which effectively expanded
the field of compensable takings to include regulatory takings4 6 In
Mahon, Pennsylvania Coal Company requested compensation for the
results of a governmental regulation which disallowed their mining of
coal in areas where mining would likely cause damage to homes built
above the coal seams." In earlier cases, the Court had frequently held
that it is within the police powers of a state to harm one person's
property in order to achieve the greater good of the community.48
Justice Holmes, however, asserted that government could go too far in
its exercise of police powers and that the determination of whether the
compensation should be awarded is a factual one.49 In support of the
case-by-case approach Holmes stated that
As long recognized some values are enjoyed under an
implied limitation and must yield to the police power.
But obviously the implied limitation must have its
limits or the contract and due process clauses are gone.
One fact for consideration in determining such limits
is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a
certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there
must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the act. So the question
depends upon the particular facts."
Furthermore, in analyzing those relevant facts, Holmes stated
that great weight should be placed on the judgment of the legislature."1
Holmes stopped short, however, of declaring that legislative prerogative
was an automatic bar to regulatory takings actions. "The greatest weight
is given to the judgment of the legislature but it always is open to
interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its

45260 U.S. 393 (1922).
46See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).

47See id. at 412.
48See Mugler, Reinman and Hadacheck supra, note 43.
49See M&JCoal Company,47 F.3d 1148, 1155 (Fed. Cir. 1995). (The Plaintiff in
M & J Coal argued that Justice Holmes' argument in Mahon required that they also be
compensated for their inability to mine. The Court in M & J Coal, however, distinguished the
two cases stating that Mahon involved conflicting private property rights, whereas the issue before
them involved private rights versus public welfare. The Court also noted that in some cases the
rights to mine directly underneath the houses, free from liability, was granted by previous
owners.). 50
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
51
See id. at 414.
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constitutional power. '' 2 Therefore, although Holmes stopped short of
requiring the regulation in question to withstand the strict scrutiny
applied to laws abridging free speech 53 or those which distinguish
between race or ethnicity5 4 he would still require the government
demonstrate more than a simple rational basis for their action. The
burden of proof, however, remains with the plaintiff.
B. Penn Central and the Refinement of the Regulatory Takings
Concept
55
Penn Central TransportationCompany v. City of New Yor
was a watershed case in takings law because it allowed governments to
expand their police powers in the area of land-use regulation. 6 In prior
cases, the Supreme Court invalidated regulations which usurped or
severely diminished the property rights of an individual, and thus
avoided deciding the cases on Fifth Amendment grounds.57
In Penn Central,the plaintiffs wanted to build a fifty-five story
office building above the Penn Central Station's Grand Central
Terminal. Their plans were thwarted when the New York City
Landmarks Preservation Commission exercised statutorily given veto
power of construction projects and denied approval to build the office
building.5 8 Plaintiffs asserted that this denial amounted to an arbitrary
deprivation of their property rights in the air-space above the terminal. 9
The Court applied the three factor test described above 60 and held the
regulation did not amount to a taking because the Plaintiffs were left
with reasonable use of their property and had other beneficial means of
improving upon their property.61

52

1d.
53See Schenk v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997)
(holding certain
injunctions held to be burdens on the free speech of protesters at abortion clinics).
54
See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733, (1978) (limiting
states ability to use race as criteria for application to a state medical school).
5 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
56
See Donald C. Guy and James A. Holloway, The Direction of Regulatory Takings
Analysis in the Post-Lochner Era, 102 DICK. L. REV. 327, 336-39 (1998).
57See Jacqueline Kerry Heyman, Regulatory Takings: When is Enough, Enough?, I I
J. NAT. RESOURCES&
ENVTL. L. 325, 328 (1995-96).
58
See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 117.
59See id.
60
See section I. B., supra.
61
The three factors include: the character of the governmental action; the regulation's
economic impact on the claimant, and the regulation's interference with distinct investmentbacked expectations of the claimant. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 119.
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Penn Central is significant in holding that although a
regulation can result in a compensable taking, the harm suffered by the
property owner must be balanced with the benefits granted the
community through the regulation. A diminution of value in one's
property will not always be a taking. 62 However, Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority in Penn Central, stated that compensation is
required when the regulation is not reasonably necessary to effectuate
a public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the owner's use
of the property.63
Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastalCouncil' is an example of the
"unduly harsh" regulations that Brennan accounted for in his Penn
Centralopinion. Lucas owned coastal lots on which he wanted to build
single-family homes similar to homes that he previously had built on
adjacent parcels. Two years after his purchase of the property, South
Carolina passed regulations forbidding any housing development on the
parcels. Lucas filed suit claiming that the effects of the regulation
amounted to a taking of his property in that it "deprive[d] [him]of any
reasonable economic use of the lots,... eliminated
the unrestricted right
6
of use, and render[ed] them valueless., 1
The United State Supreme Court agreed. 66 In the opinion for
the Court, Justice Scalia stated that "takings jurisprudence ... has been
guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding the content of,
and the State's power over, the 'bundle of rights' that they acquire when
they obtain title to property. ' 67 The 'bundle of rights' referred to by
Scalia is the collection of various rights which make up the concept of
property. These rights can include the right to possess, use and sell
property and may not always require ownership. 68 For instance, a
property owner's granting of an easement to another party is the transfer
of a "stick" from the overall bundle of sticks which comprise all
property rights.69 The government's grantiing of public access to a
beach, for instance, may be considered the forced allocation of one of
62

See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
512

(1997).
63Robert Brauneis, aThe Foundationof Our 'Regulatory Takings'Jurisprudence."

The Myth and Meaning ofJustice Homes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106
YALE L.J. 613, 690 (1996).
64505 U.S. 1003.
651d. at 1009.
'See
67

id.

1d. at 1027.
68See Daniel R. Mandelker, New Property Rights Under the Taking Clause, 81 MARQ.
L.R. 11 (1997).

69See id. (discussing the vertical and functional segmentation of this bundle of rights).
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the rights associated with property ownership and may therefore be
defined as a taking.7"
III. OPINION AND REASONING
A. The Government Asserts the Existence of Bright Line Tests
At the July 1997 trial, the court of claims refused to dismiss the
case stating that Maritrans could possibly present a set of facts proving
OPA 90 substantially interfered with their expectations about the
useful life of their vessels.7 Therefore, summary judgment was
inappropriate because at least one of the Penn Centralfactors might be
proven by Maritrans.72
The government claimed on appeal that the second tier
requirements of Penn Centralwere without importance. They asserted
that Plaintiffs should be denied compensation because their claim could
not survive the first tier of analysis (whether the Plaintiff possesses
property rights that can be protected),7 3 and they proposed two "bright
line tests" to prove this position.
First, the government claimed that Maritrans has no protected
interest in their tankers because the oil shipping industry is highly
regulated and therefore Maritrans should have expected that future
changes in regulations might require the early retirement of its
vessels.74 In short, the first "bright line" test is that participants in
highly regulated industries cannot claim rights to property that is
already the subject of intense regulation. The government also claimed
that Maritrans did not have a protected property right because the
Supreme Court has held that "non-real" property is less protected than
real property. 75 Therefore, the second "bright line" test for determining
whether a property right is present is whether or not the property in
question is real or personal.
1. Heavy Regulation and Takings
The government relied upon a trilogy of cases for its assertion
that heavy regulation of a type of property precludes compensation for
70

See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979).
71See Maritrans,40 Fed. CI. at 791.
72

See id.
73See id.
74
See id.
75
See id.
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that property in the event of a taking. Each of these cases involved a
court's finding that in a highly (federally) regulated environment, some
property interests may be disregarded by the government without
compensation. In Bowen v. PublicAgencies Opposedto SocialSecurity
Entrapment76 the Court addressed whether or not a statutory change
making it impossible for a state to withdraw from the Social Security
program constituted the taking of property.77 The Court said no property
right existed because the termination of the provision in the original
legislation which would have permitted a state to withdraw "was part
of a regulatory program over which Congress retained authority 7to8
amend in the exercise of its power to provide for the general welfare.
Accordingly, in Maritrans, the high-level of regulations of the oil
transportation business reserved in Congress the ability to make
changes to that regulatory scheme. The government's argument
required the Court to accept that the oil transportation industry was a
government construct, and OPA 90 was merely a change in the existing
regulatory scheme.
Another case relied upon by the government, Mitchell Arms
Inc. v. United States,79 addressed the existence of property rights in a
government issued permit to import automatic rifles from Yugoslavia.
Mitchell was a federally-licensed firearms importer who sold to
wholesale and retail distributors and worked under permits to import
automatic weapons commonly known as "assault rifles". s On March
14, 1989, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF"),
announced a suspension of all pending applications for such permits.
Mitchell contacted the ATF and was told that he could still operate
under his existing permit. Relying on this information, Mitchell
arranged for a shipment of rifles and negotiated an irrevocable letter of
credit for their purchase as part of the transaction.8 ' On March 21, the
ATF announced the suspension of all importation of assault rifles,
including those purchased under existing permits.8 2 Mitchell sued to
recover the funds he lost when he purchased the irrevocable letter of
credit for goods he could no longer import.

76477 U.S. 41 (1986).
id. at 42.
77See
8

Id.
797 F.3d 212 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
"0See id. at 213.
81
82See id. at 214.
See id.
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The court of appeals held that Mitchell's property right was
ownership of the rifles purchased through the letter of credit. s3 ATF's
suspension of the license only took a collateral right, the right to import
the rifles into the United States, and loss of that collateral right alone
did not amount to a loss in his ownership right.' The court held that
"collateral rights in property" are not protected property rights and are
thus not covered by the Fifth Amendment requirement of just
compensation. 5 Similarly, the government in Maritransassumes that
the right to use single-hulled tankers to transport oil is a right which is
only collateral to Maritrans' right to own the vessels.
The court in Mitchell relied in part on reasoning set forth in
Allied-GeneralNuclear Services v. UnitedStates.86 In Allied, the Court
of Appeals held that even though the government had "actively
promoted and induced the plaintiff s expenditure of over $200 million"
to build a plutonium recycling plant and that the eventual withdrawal
of their permit to operate that plant made his investment worthless, the
plaintiffs inability to show either an express or implied contract meant
that they possessed no property rights.87
The Allied court stated that "(t)he Constitutional control of
Congress over the public fisc is an adverse factor against liability for
mere 'jawboning' by government employee's not authorized to commit
it to legal liability., 88 The Allied decision offers strong support for the
government's claims that the withdrawal of Maritrans' permits to
operate single-hulled tankers is fully within the regulatory discretion of
Congress and did not justify compensation even if Maritrans relied on
the government's previous approval of the vessels.
The Maritranscourt rejected the government's contention that
Mitchell, Bowen and Allied establish that the property of any industry
which is highly regulated by the government cannot be invested with
property rights. The situation in these three cases, the court held, are
easily distinguishable from the case at bar. 9 Each of the cases cited by
the government concerned industries closely linked with national
security or which have a history of volatile regulations. Arms trading
has always been influenced by the government's opinions toward which
nations are acceptable trade partners, and those who deal in the
83

See id.
"See id. at 217.
85
1d.
86839 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 819 (1988).
87
1d. at 1577.
88Id. at 1578.
89See Maritrans, 40 Fed. CI. at 796.
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importation of arms know that government involvement in their
business is an ever-present fact of life. 90 Due to the high level of
politicization and susceptibility to fears of foreign attacks or thievery,
changes in national policy on nuclear weapons during times ofturbulent
foreign relations are to be expected. 9'
Finally, the regulation of the maritime shipping industry is
certainly distinct from the government's decisions on how it operates
Social Security, a program wholly created by Congress.92 Shipping is
not a creature of Congress, and has a tradition that greatly precedes the
Congress or the Court itself. The court of claims also pointed out that
the holdings of the federal courts have rendered some highly regulated
industries all but exempt from a takings claim. 93 For instance, the
banking industry has not been allowed to assert that the governmental
seizure of failing financial institutions is a compensable taking. 94 No
court has ever claimed that a highly regulated industry should not have
the Penn Centralfactors applied to them at all. Instead, it is the nature
of the above regulations that allow courts to consistently reach the same
conclusion ofno compensable taking. 95 Therefore, the oil transportation
industry deserves a right to have its situation examined under the
traditional Penn Centralanalysis.
It should also be noted that in 1980 the Coast Guard had
proposed regulations requiring ocean-going vessels to have doublehulls. A study performed by the National Academy of Science,
however, found that such a regulation would be a financial strain of96
such magnitude as to bankrupt some industry companies.
Subsequently, the Coast Guard withdrew the proposed rule change. 97
This fact makes it more difficult to hold that Maritrans knew that a
double-hullrequirement was likely.

9°See id.
91
92see id. at 797.
See id.
93See Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571 (1995) (concerning the highly
regulated banking industry and takings claims as applied to insolvent institutions); see also
Concrete Pipe and Prods. of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for
Southern California, 508 U.S. 602 (1993) (concerning the difficulty in proving a takings claim
in ERISA cases).
94
9 5See Maritrans,40 Fed. Cl. at 797.
See id.
96
See id. at 791.
97See id.
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2. Property Rights are Less Favored for Personal
Property
The government maintained that even if the court did not
recognize a "bright line" test which excludes highly regulated
industries from traditional takings jurisprudence, it should not ignore
that a distinction has been drawn between the taking of real property
and personal property. The government asserted that personal property
has traditionally enjoyed less protection than real property from
regulatory takings. For example, in Andrus v. Allard,9" the Supreme
Court held that a prohibition on the sale of eagle feathers did not
constitute a taking even though it rendered the goods economically
worthless. In Andrus, claimant was a dealer in Native American
artifacts. Some of these artifacts included feathers from birds, the sale
of which had been banned pursuant to the Eagle Protection Act and
Migratory Bird Treaty Act. As with Maritrans, the personal property
claimed to have been "taken" from Andrus was procured by the
claimant before the regulation in question was promulgated. 99
The government claims that the real/personal property
distinction ofAndrus was echoed in Lucas,when the Court held that "in
the case of personal property, by reason of the State's traditionally high
degree of control over commercial dealings, [an owner] ought to be
aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render his
property economically worthless (at least if the property's only
economically productive use is sale or manufacture for sale)."'O0 This
line of reasoning would allow the government to be successful in
Maritrans even if the property in question was not itself highly
regulated since personal property in general is highly regulated.
The highly regulated nature of personal property, so the
argument goes, should put the owner on alert that it may also suffer
further regulation by the state. Justice Scalia supports this particular
argument by noting that within the history of the Takings Clause, real
property, unlike personal property, has not had "the 'implied limitation'
that the State may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable
use.'" °0 In contrast, owners of real property have enjoyed, and even
relied upon, the government's historical reluctance to regulate real
property. Thus, there is not any notice to real property owners that a
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444 U.S. 51 (1979).
99See id. at 51.
100Id. at 797-98 (citing Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66-67).
10 1Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028.
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significant portion of their ownership rights could be terminated at any
time.
The court of claims noted that Scalia's line of analysis was
mere dicta and not binding upon the court.'0 2 The court also held that
the government's argument amounted to only a modified version of the
"highly regulated" exception disposed of above.'0 3 The court went on
to conclude that neither Lucas nor Mitchell held that regulation, per se,
precluded all property rights in personal property; rather, personal
property has traditionally been treated differently from real property
because it has always been more highly regulated." ° Those limits, the
court maintained, have been applied on an ad hoc basis.'0 5 For instance,
in Mitchell, the court considered whether the industry in which the
personalty is used depends upon a governmental regulatory scheme and
whether or not property rights exist independent of that scheme. 0 6
However, if a regulation goes beyond the "background expectations"
07
of the property owner, the loss of those rights are to be compensated.1
The court of claims stated that even though the oil shipping
business was highly regulated, as was the system of import permits in
place in Mitchell, Maritrans' use of shipping vessels was not dependent
on a governmental regulatory scheme. 108 Instead, Maritrans relied on
preexisting rights of use under the common law, none of which prevent
OPA 90 from being a taking.' 0 9 It also noted that the degree of
regulation did not imply that the transportation of oil by tankers and
barges was a nuisance, or otherwise inclined to be prohibited under
common law."0 Therefore, OPA 90 was not within Maritrans'
"background expectations" and thus qualified as a compensatory taking.
In summarizing its position, the court relied upon the case of
Abrahim-Youri v. United States,"' a case that also originated in the
court of claims. Abrahim-Youri was one of several individuals that had
claims pending against the Government of Iran, following that nation's

02

1 See Maritrans,
03

40 Fed. Cl. at 799.
1 See id. at 798.
t4See id.
05
1 See id. at 799 (discussion of B-West Imports, Inc. v. United States,
75 F.3d 633
(1996)).

id. at 798 (citing Mitchell Arms, Inc. v. United States, 7 F.3d 212 (1993)).
"See
id.
0
1 8See Maritrans,40 Fed.
Cl. at 798.
'0 9See id. at 798, n. 17 (discussing how traditional property rights have inhered to
vessel ownership).
t t0
Maritrans 40 Fed. Cl. at 799.
111139 F.3d 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
106See
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attack on the United States Embassy in Tehran." 2 As part of a
settlement agreement with Iran, the United States government voided
all citizen actions against Iran and offered to pay off all canceled
claims out of a fifty million dollar fund created for this purpose." 3 The
fifty million dollars was insufficient to meet all of the claims against
Iran, and plaintiffs claimed that their loss of the right to sue Iran for the
difference (per the government's agreement with Iran) was a
governmental takiig. 4 The Federal Court of Claims found no taking
occurred and this decision was upheld by the Federal Court of
Appeals."1 5
The court of appeals inAbrahim-Youri did not claim as support
for their decision the heavy regulation of foreign investments or the
fact that the loss was of personal property only, even though applying
such blanket rules were available options." 6 Instead, they held that
"those who engage in international commerce must be aware that
international relations sometimes become strained, and that
governments engage in a variety of activities designed to maintain a
degree of international amity."" 7 In other words, the court of appeals
held that preexisting common law or state law "background principles"
define the "sticks" of a property owner's bundle of rights. AbrahimYouri contained those facts which the government in Maritrans
claimed as proof of their argument, yet the court of appeals chose to
ignore them. The Maritrans court used the silence of the court of
appeals as precedent for their decision.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Federal Court of Claims has rejected the government's
attempt to draw "bright lines" in the sometimes murky environment of
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause jurisprudence. At a subsequent trial,
the court of claims added nothing to the "bright lines" analysis though
it did hold that the mere passage of OPA 90 did not result in a taking." 8
Accordingly, compensation may be due Maritrans once OPA 90 has
required the retirement of vessels in its fleet, but just because a

"'See id. at 1474-65.
1 See Maritrans,40 Fed. Cl. at 799-80.
"1
4See id.
[i5See id.
'tSee id. at 800 (In this instance, the personal property in question was the chosen by
the Plaintiff in
an action against the Iranian government).
1'71d.
1I See id.
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legislative act has economic consequences does not mean a taking has
occurred. 1 9
Even though the Maritransdecision does not provide the bright
lines that would add predictability to regulatory takings claims, in its
rejection of those bright lines, the court of claims does help sharpen
some areas of takings law. First, how highly regulated must an
industry be before a regulatory taking is not compensable? The court
suggests that the level of regulation, though a factor, must be viewed
in light of the history of that regulation. Industries or activities that are
traditionally susceptible to high levels of regulation may be subject to
the taking of property rights without compensation on an ad hoc
basis. 20 One would assume that this exception would apply to
industries that produce toxic by-products, uncomfortable levels of
noise, or intense odors.
Other highly regulated industries that may be precluded from
compensation for regulatory takings are those that depend upon a
governmental regulatory scheme. Both Mitchell (which involved the
international arms sales industry) and Allied-General(which involved
the nuclear energy industry) have traditionally relied upon the
government's regulatory scheme in order to operate. In a sense, these
industries exist only at the insistence of Congress. It appears
reasonable, therefore, that any level of regulation, and perhaps even the
complete prohibition against the activities central to these industries,
must be contemplated if not expected by industry participants. 2 ' Put
another way, when the nature of an industry's regulation obviates
reasonable reliance upon currently existing property rights, a taking by
further regulation cannot be said to interfere with the property owner's
investment backed expectations. Therefore, the Penn Central test
would not be applicable to property owners in that particular industry.
The Maritransdecision also holds that the historical context of
regulations are important in determining whether a compensable taking
has occurred. The court demands that for an industry to be essentially
without property rights, it must have a history which recognizes this
fact. One must look at the common law treatrient of an industry or
19
' See id.
120See Maritrans, 40 Fed. Cl. at 799.
12 11t should be noted that both Allied-Generaland Mitchell involve situations in which

the claimant relied upon the promise of government officials when making their investment. In
Allied-General, the claimant relied upon a permit issued by a government agency while in
Mitchell, the claimant relied on verbal assurances that his permit would be honored. However,
Bowen is perhaps a clearer example of a property right based upon a governmental regulatory
schema, namely, the Social Security system.
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property type and determine whether a regulatory taking is "off
limits. t'

22

The trait of being "off limits" to non-compensated

regulatory takings may be limited, however, as this trait most likely has
a high correlation with those industries which rely on a scheme of
governmental regulation or are traditionally held as nuisances under the
common law.
Finally, is there a distinction between the taking of personal
property and the taking of real property? The Lucas decision hints of
such a distinction. Though not relied upon by the Maritrans court,
Justice Scalia's dicta in Lucas may be a harbinger of the future
direction of the Court under which a bright line test may emerge.
Justice Scalia claims that because of the government's traditionally high
level of involvement in commercial dealings and because personal
property, historically and culturally, has been highly regulated, an
individual's loss of a stick from the bundle of personal property rights
is to be expected and thus not eligible for compensation upon a
1 23

regulatory taking.

Whether or not such a blanket rule covering personal property
is workable or desirable need not be considered here, particularly since
the court was also given facts which demonstrated that the government
had earlier rejected such a regulation as unworkable. Even if Justice
Scalia's reasoning had not been dicta, there was a strong argument that
the implied risk inherent in personal property ownership had been
waived by the government's own actions (the rejections of an earlier
proposed double-hull requirement). But as Mitchell and Allied
demonstrated, the Court has been reluctant to find the government to
be liable for compensation even when the claimant invested in the
property based upon the words or deeds of the government.
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1 See Maritrans, 40 Fed. CI. at
798.
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1 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028.

